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Abstract— We investigate shared language between U.S.
Supreme Court majority opinions and interest groups’ cor-
responding amicus briefs. Specifically, we evaluate whether
language that originated in an amicus brief acquired legal
precedent status by being cited in the Court’s opinion. Using
plagiarism detection software, automated querying of a large le-
gal database, and manual analysis, we establish seven instances
where interest group amici were able to formulate constitutional
case law, setting binding legal precedent. We discuss several
such instances for their implications in the Supreme Court’s
creation of case law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Through amicus briefs, the U.S. Supreme Court allows
third parties to contribute important facts, make legal ar-
guments, or point to economic and policy implications of
the case. Intended as a means for experts (friends of the
court, amicus curiae) to help the court make more informed
decisions, it has been noted that the past decades have seen
a significant increase in amicus briefs submitted by interest
groups of all sorts [2]. The creation of legal briefs is costly,
and it may be assumed that most amicus briefs present a
group’s vested interest, rather than neutral advice [3].
Amicus briefs are posted to the court at two stages of
proceedings: first, during petition for certiorari, during which
the Supreme Court decides whether an appeal to hear a
case is granted (certiorari stage). Second, after certiorari
has been granted and in preparation for a hearing (merits
stage). Together with two other document types, the original
petition for certiorari and the merits briefs (formal arguments
by the parties directly involved in a case), amicus briefs
provide the argumentative basis on which a case is then
finally heard. After all proceedings, the court’s final decision
is documented in a written majority opinion [4]. Individual
justices may file minority opinions if they disagree in part
or in whole with the majority, however only the majority
opinion sets precedent: a written decision by the Supreme
Court is binding federal law for all U.S. courts in that similar
cases must follow the ruling.
In practice, there are very few restrictions on who is
allowed to submit an amicus brief [3], and some briefs
have been shown to be of spurious scientific value. In
some instances, this has not stopped the court from relying
on amicus briefs in its ruling [1]. In times of increasing
complexity of information, and increasing ease of fabricated
or misinterpreted data, the Supreme Court’s responsibility of
evaluating the quality of received briefs is becoming more
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and more challenging. This is especially true of amicus briefs
that claim to be based on privileged, and hence unpublished,
data (see [1] for examples).
We argue that the exact wording of Supreme Court
opinions matters, regardless of factual accuracy: by setting
precedent, each Supreme Court opinion creates constitutional
case law, which subsequent jurisdictions have to respect.
When these jurisdictions, whether Supreme Court or lower
courts, apply precedent opinions to their new cases, exact
language matters, because it determines the realm of possible
interpretation—in some cases, this may have unforeseen
implications.
Indeed, some interest groups have openly stated that
their motivation in regularly submitting amicus briefs to the
Supreme Court is to over time “mold” cumulative case law
to favor their positions [5]. This is achieved, of course,
by directly influencing Justice voting behavior, which has
been studied widely [6], [7], [8], [9], [10].1 It is also
achieved, however, by shaping the specific wording of the
majority opinion, which determines the precedent set for
future interpretation.
Previous studies have compared opinion language with
amicus language and found frequent instances of overlapping
language; this can partly be attributed to the work of Supreme
Court legal clerks, who in drafting a written opinion are
tasked with summarizing the arguments that led to the
majority’s decision. In this process of collating arguments,
it is common practice to rely on wording provided by the
relevant documents and briefs (petition documents, merits
briefs, amicus briefs), sometimes without explicit citation of
sources [1], [3], [4], [11], [12].
Building on this body of literature, this study asks if direct
evidence can be found that interest groups acting as amici
were allowed to formulate constitutional case law. More
specifically, we aim to detect and quantify instances where
amicus language has set precedent, after being used in the
Supreme Court’s majority opinion.
Where it is possible to plausibly argue that wording by
third-party interest groups was awarded binding constitu-
tional precedent through opinion text, it is likely that “mold-
ing” has occurred to some degree. In some instances, this
may be concerning, when partisan positions shape constitu-
tional case law; in others, it may be the result of assiduous
amicus work. In any case, it is revealing to trace precedent
language back to its origins within the legal process, and to
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become conscious of the “molding” power granted to amici.
We are unaware of any previous work to this end.
II. DATA AND METHODS
While all Supreme Court cases are publicly available, we
could not find a comprehensive, readily available dataset.
We therefore collected our own data, comprising almost all
Supreme Court cases from October terms (OT) 2007 through
2011 (October 2007-June 2012).2
It is common practice for the Supreme Court to bundle
several cases in one opinion; we therefore follow the liter-
ature in using dockets as the unit of our analysis. Overall,
our data comprises 408 dockets, which we collected from
the coverage on the website SCOTUSblog.3 Due to lacking
coverage, this is 12 dockets short of all dockets from the
2007-2011 October terms.
For each docket, we downloaded all case metadata, the
majority opinion, and all amicus briefs. This led to a total
of 3196 amicus briefs, the distribution of which is shown
in figure 1. After crawling the page, we had to convert all
documents from pdf format to plain text. This introduced
some encoding noise, but worked remarkably well overall.
Following [12] and [4], we then used the open-source
plagiarism4 checker WCopyfind5 to compare each opinion
with the docket’s associated amicus briefs. We deviated
from the default settings used in the literature, defining
overlapping language as a sequence of 10 words or more,
of which at least 80% of words need to match exactly. Our
increase of the minimum match-length from the default 6
words to 10 words was necessary to avoid common turns of
phrases and other snippets, and focus on more meaningful
language overlap.
We found 21,361 instances of overlapping language be-
tween majority opinions and their corresponding amicus
briefs. Even after increasing the requirements of language
overlap, the majority of matches are still common phrases or
shared references to previous (case) laws. Within these raw
language matches, we then searched instances where amicus
language had successfully reached precedent status.
To do so, we used Lexis Advance6, a comprehensive,
proprietary legal database, to establish whether a language
snippet had appeared in any court case (including lower
courts) before the Supreme Court case in question. If the
snippet had appeared, we concluded that the language snippet
could not have originated in the amicus brief: it was either
2All code used to obtain and analyze our data is available at https:
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3http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/
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Even when language is clearly overlapping between an amicus brief and the
majority opinion, and said language is not cited, the fact that the “friend of
the court” wrote the brief with the expressed purpose of being used in the
proceedings seems to mitigate the notion of “plagiarism.” Notwithstanding
these considerations, it may be preferable practice to cite sources where
they influence opinion wording [12].
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bloomfieldmedia.com/wordpress/software/wcopyfind/
6https://advance.lexis.com/
Fig. 1: Histogram of the number of amicus briefs per
Supreme Court docket, OT 2007-2011 (408 dockets in total,
3196 amicus briefs). Note that 57 dockets had no associated
amicus briefs.
a phrase commonly found in legal proceedings, or had some
precedent status prior to the Supreme Court case in question.
To focus only on snippets that achieved some form of
precedent after being used in the majority opinion, we then
queried whether the exact snippet appeared in later cases, in
any court.
This process of querying the Lexis Advance database
for all 21,361 matches yielded 944 language snippets that
satisfied all of the following conditions:
1) The snippet is at least 10 words long.
2) The snippet is used in an amicus brief.
3) The snippet is used in the corresponding majority
opinion, with an overlap of at least 80% of words.
4) The exact snippet from the opinion was never used in
a court of law before the Supreme Court case.
5) The exact snippet from the opinion was used at least
once in subsequent cases in any court of law.
These conditions make it likely that a language snippet
did indeed originate in an amicus brief and achieved legal
precedent through inclusion in a majority opinion. Further-
more, the precedent has already manifested itself at least
once. Unfortunately, inspection showed that the exact-match
queries performed on Lexis Advance were a limitation, as
even very minor changes implied that either (i) previous use
of the snippet was not detected, or (ii) later citation of the
snippet as used in the opinion was not picked up. Since Lexis
Advance does not allow queries for softer language overlap,
this is a limitation we could not address automatically. Given
the 944 snippets found by our process, we therefore started
a manual analysis, tracing back the origins of snippets and
evaluating relevance of the generated evidence.
Despite the limitations, we believe that ours is a previously
unused method of tracing specific language through its
propagation in legal proceedings, from a likely originator




Given the stark limitations of exact-match queries on
previous and following cases, our results are surprisingly
rich. Due to time constraints, we only analyzed 100 out of the
944 snippets originally found; we found seven instances of
precedent-setting amicus brief language that warrant further
attention.
Manual analysis of our results is a challenging task, as
legal language needs to be carefully considered for the
following conditions. This decision of whether or not a
snippet is an amicus-set precedent (ASP) is not always
straight-forward.
1) The snippet is “interesting,” i.e. the language overlap
is more significant than just a turn of phrase (noise).
2) The snippet did not have precedent before being used
by the amicus. Specifically, it is not a citation or
direct paraphrase from previous legislation or Supreme
Court opinions (this check was made necessary by the
limitation of exact-match queries on Lexis Advance).
3) The language did not originate from petition docu-
ments. When an amicus’ paraphrase of language from
the petition for certiorari appears in the majority opin-
ion, this likely just indicates that the amicus understood
the “crux” of the case itself.
As we had to limit our analysis to 100 snippets, we
looked at the 50 snippets with most appearances in later
court cases (893–23 later appearances), and then looked at
50 randomly selected snippets from the remaining results
(22–1 appearances) to get a more representative idea of our
data.
Within the 50 snippets with most later appearances (i.e.
cited the most), we found one ASP. In the 50 randomly
selected snippets, we found 6 ASP – if this random sample
is representative, we would expect around 110 instances of
ASP in our complete dataset.
As expected, the rate of ASP was much higher outside of
the most-appearances results. This is intuitive, as oft-cited
snippets are more likely to be former precedents that our
methods failed to pick up.
In the remainder of this section, we present a selection of
ASP found using the methods described.
A. Third-party language
First, in Wal-Mart v. Dukes (OT 2010), Wal-Mart peti-
tioned against the largest class action law suit in U.S. history,
in which six women held that the company systematically
disadvantaged women employees. In a 5-4 decision for Wal-
Mart, the court held that the six respondents could not
represent all 1.5 million women employees of the company
as one class, overruling previous decisions granting the class
action lawsuit.
In its amicus brief in support of Wal-Mart, the Intel
Corporation cites from a law review on class action lawsuits.
While published in a respected law review, this article to
this point had been one academic’s work—after the Supreme
Court joined Intel in citing verbatim from the article, its
language gained federal precedent status. Since 2011, the
exact wording has been cited in 108 cases (See Fig. 2).
This is a relatively common type of ASP: a third party’s
language gains precedent after being used in an amicus brief.
Careful consideration is required to parse out whether an
amicus has indeed popularized a third party’s wording, or
whether the brief has merely understood the relevance of
an outside source. We note that the mere fact that language
originates from a non-precedent third party source does not
make the overlap uninteresting, since the amicus can choose
from a wide range of “scientific” opinions and wording to
use.
Other examples of ASP produced from third party lan-
guage follow. In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder, we found that the amici were the
ones to first introduce the The Promise and Pitfalls of the
New Voting Rights Act, an article in the Yale Law Journal,
into case law. Similarly, in Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders of the County of Burlington, the amici were
able to introduce the work of a study done by the New
Jersey Commission of Investigation (Gangland Behind Bars-
How and Why Organized Criminal Street Gangs Thrive in
New Jersey’s Prisons). The study’s wording has since re-
appeared in proceedings twice (See Fig. 5). Another example,
presented in Fig. 6, shows an amicus brief introducing
language from an opinion of the Supreme Court of the
Territory of Michigan – which awarded federal precedent
to state law language.
B. Original amicus language
A second class of overlap can be found in Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co. Caperton challenged the constitutionality
of a judge not recusing himself from a case in which one of
the parties donated 3 million dollars to his election campaign.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court decided that it was in
fact unconstitutional for a judge to not recuse himself based
on the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment.
The Conference of Chief Justices filed a brief in which
they discuss the implications of the upcoming decision and
how it might affect public trust of the judicial system. The
majority opinion directly attributes original language from
the brief as a concise summarization of one of the key points
of the case. In this case, original brief language achieved
federal precedent. Indeed, the exact opinion quotation in Fig.
3 was cited 9 times subsequent to the decision.
This type of language overlap is most striking – amicus
language is used in the majority opinion as an authority,
and manifests precedent in subsequent jurisdiction. It is
somewhat reassuring that this is the only example of original
amicus language precedent we found so far, and in this
case it originated from esteemed justices. Even so, it seems
worthwhile to ask how much leeway the amicus had in
wording their brief, and how their particular choice of
wording influenced future case law.
C. Amicus paraphrase
The final type of ASP we found is a significant paraphrase
by the amicus of existing precedent. One example is given
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in Padilla v. Kentucky, where Padilla argued that it is the
duty of counsel to advise on the risk of deportation in a
criminal case. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court decided
that a lawyer is indeed required, within the context of the 6th
Amendment, to advise his client on the risks of deportation.
Elena Kagan, then solicitor general (and current Supreme
Court Justice), filed a brief arguing for a stricter definition
of the roles and duties of council in the U.S. adversarial
system. In her brief, Kagan leverages a previous Supreme
Court opinion, but emphatically paraphrases it with her own
language, which gets quoted directly by the opinion (see Fig.
4).
IV. LIMITATIONS
Our results come with several limitations. First of all,
neither of us is versed enough in legal specifics to determine
the relevance and factual correctness of our results; the
evidence seems strong enough to be concerned about the
results presented herein, but much of the language overlap
we found may be deemed common practice or uninteresting
by a lawyer.
The biggest technical limitation in our method is the exact-
match search within Lexis Advance. With a “softer” method
of searching, we would have been able to produce potentially
more, higher-quality results automatically, for example be-
cause we could have ignored instances were an amicus cites
previous federal precedent with only minuscule alterations.
Weeding out such cases manually was an arduous, and
potentially error-prone task. With high likelihood, we also
missed later appearances of language matches that would
have indicated stronger precedent-setting (see the discussion
in section 2 above).
Furthermore, for our original argument we would not
have needed to consider only language that has already
been cited: whether or not opinion language is cited, it has
precedent. Such precedent may manifest itself at any point
in the future. In this paper, we used the criterion of later
appearance as a way to weed out “uninteresting” language –
more sophisticated techniques would make this unnecessary.
Due to the manual nature of our analysis, we could only
inspect 100 instances out of our 944 matches. At best,
this sample size may provide a preview of what further
investigation may surface – our results are by no means
comprehensive yet.
Finally, we only took into account Supreme Court cases
from the October Terms 2007 through 2011. Since the effects
of precedent may take decades to manifest, it would be
interesting to repeat this analysis with more historic data—
which would mandate a less manual analysis, as significantly
more results would be expected.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel way to find the origins
of precedent-setting legal language in Supreme Court amicus
briefs. We then trace this language from the brief through the
majority opinion into precedent and later court cases.
Given the authors’ lack of legal experience, our results
should be taken with some precaution; however, we hold
that our results seem convincing enough to warrant further
investigation. We believe that our results strongly suggest
that in certain instances, amici have been able to define
language that set federal precedent. Whether or not this is
problematic in itself is a philosophic question; we believe
that in any case, precedent set by private interest groups is
damaging to the public legitimacy of the institution of the
Supreme Court (see [12]). Along with other arguments made
in [1], we believe that our results suggest scrutiny of the role
of the “friends of the court” in Supreme Court proceedings,
and that the practice of amici may deserve a revision of
standards.
Finally, we note that the relative consistency and con-
formity of legal language allows relatively straight-forward
tracing of language snippets. To our knowledge, this charac-
teristic has not yet been fully exploited by existing academic
work.
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“The ‘crux’ of Rule 23(b)(2), however, is the
‘indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory
remedy warranted–the notion that the conduct is
such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful
only as to all of the class members or as to none of
them.’ Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in
the Age of Aggregate Proof. 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
97, 132 (2009).”
“The key to the (b)(2) class is ‘the indivisible
nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy
warratned–the notion that the conduct is such that
it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to
all of the class members or as to none of them.’
Nagareda, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev., at 132.”’
(Brief for the Intel Corporation in Support of
Petitioner)
(Opinion by Scalia, Jun 2011)
Fig. 2: Wal-Mart v. Dukes. This is one example of how an amicus brief first quoted a third party, whose wording later
achieved precedent to the level of constitutional case law through the majority opinion. The exact quotation (in italics) has
since been subsequently cited verbatim in court 108 times.
“As judicial election campaigns become costlier
and more politicized, public confidence in the fair-
ness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges
may be imperiled.’
“The Conference of the Chief Justices has under-
scored that the codes are ”[t]he principal safeguard
against judicial campaign abuses” that threaten
to imperil ”public confidence in the fairness and
integrity of the nation’s elected judges.” Brief for
Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae 4,
11.”
(Conference of Chief Justices in Support of Neither
Party)
(Opinion by Kennedy, Jun 2009)
Fig. 3: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. This exemplifies original amicus brief language being cited and used
as an authority, and thereby achieving precedent. The exact quotation (in italics) has since been subsequently cited verbatim
in court 9 times.
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“Because counsel’s function is to make the ad-
versarial testing process work in the particular
case, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, counsel is
not constitutionally required to provide advice on
matters that will not be decided in the criminal
case: matters that have nothing to do with the
defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charges
and that are not part of the punishment that the
prosecution seeks to impose for the offense. ”
“The Solicitor General has urged us to conclude
that Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim only to
the extent that he has alleged affirmative mis-
advice. In the United States’ view, ”counsel is
not constitutionally required to provide advice on
matters that will not be decided in the criminal
case . . .,” though counsel is required to provide
accurate advice if she [*370] chooses to discusses
these matters. Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 10.”
(Brief for the United States of America in Support of
Affirmance)
(Opinion by Stevens, Mar 2010)
Fig. 4: In Padilla v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Elena Kagan acting as Solicitor General filed a brief in which she
paraphrased existing federal case law, to argue her point. This paraphrasing has been used in the majority opinion, and the
exact quotation (in italics) has since been subsequently cited verbatim in court 2 times.
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(1) “Since Section 5 continues to burden only cer-
tain jurisdictions, the reauthorization can only be
justified on evidence showing how differences in
minority voter discrimination exist between the
covered and noncovered jurisdictions. Nathaniel
Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New
Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L.J. 174, 195 (2007).”
“Congress heard warnings from supporters of ex-
tending 5 that the evidence in the record did
not address ”systematic differences between the
covered and the non-covered areas of the United
States[,] . . . and, in fact, the evidence that is in the
record suggests that there is more similarity than
difference.” The Continuing Need for Section 5
Pre-Clearance: Hearing before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess.,
10 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes); see
also Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New
Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L. J. 174, 208 (2007)”
(Pacific Legal Foundation, the Center for Equal
Opportunity)
(Opinion by Roberts, Jun 2009)
(2) “In 2009, the New Jersey State Commission of
Investication (”SCI”) authored a study entitled
Gangland Behind Bars. The investigation revealed
that nearly 150,000 documented members of crim-
inal street gangs are currently incarcerated in fed-
eral, state and local correctional facilities around
the nation.”
“Jails and prisons also face grave threats posed
by the increasing number of gang members who
go through the intake process. See Brief for Po-
licemen’s Benevolent Association, Local 249, et
al. as Amici Curiae 14 (hereinafter PBA Brief);
New Jersey Comm’n of Investigation, Gangland
Behind Bars: How and Why Organized Criminal
Street Gangs Thrive in New Jersey’s Prisons...
And What Can Be Done About It.”
(Policemen’s Benevolent Assoc. Local 249 et al.) (Opinion by Kennedy, Apr 2012)
Fig. 5: Further examples of how amici introduced studies and articles into mainstream case law. (Note that the amicus brief
in (2) cited the entire source in the table of authorities; the shown citation is the context in which it was used.)
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(1) “The Michigan Territory’s Supreme Court, also
in a libel case, explained that the Constitution
”grants to the citizen the right to keep and bear
arms. But the grant of this privilege cannot be
construed into a right in him who keeps a gun
to destroy his neighbor. United States v. Sheldon,
5 Blume Sup. Ct. Trans. 337, 1829 WL 3021, at
*12.”
“An 1829 decision by the Supreme Court of
Michigan said: ”The constitution of the United
States also grants to the citizen the right to keep
and bear arms. But the grant of this privilege
cannot be construed into the right in him who
keeps a gun to destroy his neighbor. No rights are
intended to be granted by the constitution for an
unlawful or unjustifiable purpose.” United States
v. Sheldon, in 5 Transactions of the Supreme
Court of the Territory of Michigan 337, 346 (W.
Blume ed. 1940)[...].”
(Brief for the CATO Institute and History Professor
Joyce Lee Malcolm in Support of Respondent)
(Opinion by Scalia, Jun 2008)
(2) “recognizing residual tort liability for anyone
‘who intentionally causes injury to another,’ in-
cluding ‘where a person defrauds another for the
purpose of causing pecuniary harm to a third
person”’
“And the Restatement specifically recognizes ‘a
cause of action’ in favor of the injured party where
the defendant ‘defrauds another for the purpose
of causing pecuniary harm to a third person.”’
(Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents)
(Opinion by Thomas, Jun 2008)
Fig. 6: Further examples of how amici quoted legal sources that did not have federal precedent at the time of writing, where
the opinion elevated the used language to federal precedent.
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